

Editorial - Environmental Rights and Animal Rights: Entanglements¹

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I. Introduction

Entanglements between environmental rights and animal rights have recently thickened and multiplied such that their distinct scholarly territories are, if not operating with fully open borders, at least significantly bridged. Concepts of animal rights, rights for nature, and environmental human rights—including a right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, and “greened” substantive and procedural human rights—have each evolved through rich and interdisciplinary scholarship and activism. There are ethical philosophical, political, and legal components to rights discourse, with contributions also frequently made by anthropology, cultural studies, development studies, education, international relations, sociology, and more.

Given that rights scholarship maintains deep interdisciplinary connections, it is peculiar that connections between environmental rights scholarship and animal rights scholarship have established comparatively slowly. The decision to attend to the connections between environmental rights and animal rights in this second issue of the Environmental Rights Review (ERR) makes a clear statement as to the scholarly state of the art: those connections are not only established, but now considered fundamental to scholarly debate concerning environmental rights.

Additionally, the early inclusion of this special issue in the ERR is indicative of the mainstreaming of animal rights scholarship in legal studies more broadly. Once an eccentricity or oddity, animal rights scholarship, curricula,³ litigation,⁴ and other practice now exists in many of the most enduring and well-respected legal spaces the discipline has to offer. Animal rights theory is now frequently considered a dominant normative framework for animal law scholars⁵ with a ‘critical mass’ of scholarship having emerged on the topic.⁶ This scholarship has engaged deeply with justifications for moral and legal animal rights, as well as advancing to consider what particular rights animals may hold and how they can be embedded within various legal regimes. Another sign of animal rights scholarship’s maturity is that it inspires scholarship, my own included, that explores critical alternatives to animal rights, thereby accepting animal rights as an important framework that requires recognition. Importantly, the animal question has been placed before legal regimes, normative frameworks, and lines of enquiry across the entire spectrum of legal scholarship. This reflects

¹ My thanks to the Environmental Rights Review team, particularly Irene Antonopoulos, for making this special issue possible. I am grateful to the authors and reviewers of this special issue for their diligence, creativity, and thoughtful engagement with the subject matter.

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³ See, for example, Raffael N Fasel and Sean C Butler, *Animal Rights Law* (Hart 2023).

⁴ This has been mapped in many recent works, including Iyan Offor, *Global Animal Law from the Margins: International Trade in Animals and Their Bodies* (Routledge 2024) and Kristen Stilt, ‘Rights of Nature, Rights of Animals’ (2021) 134 Harvard Law Review Forum 276.

⁵ Anne Peters, ‘Liberté, Egalité, Animalité: Human-Animal Comparisons in Law’ (2016) 5 Transnational Environmental Law 25, 42.

⁶ Tom Sparks, Visa Kurki, and Saskia Stucki, ‘Editorial – Animal rights: interconnections with human rights and the environment’ (2020) 11(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 149, 150.

a teleological perception that regards animal law as being defined by its mode of enquiry rather than by its emergence as a separable legal regime.⁷

Following the ERR's first issue on the young but potentially principal environmental human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, this second issue attends to the place of the animal within environmental rights scholarship. This issue also notes scholarship that investigates the inverse migration; of nature and human rights into scholarship of animal rights, law, policy, and broader studies. Through this exploration, it is demonstrated how the animal question can be used as an intellectual exercise and analytical tool to pinpoint logical fallacies, argumentative gaps, and moral quagmires in law and legal scholarship. As this issue will demonstrate, the animal question is an effective tool in this regard because inconsistency, inauthenticity and even wilful ignorance or disregard is commonplace in actions, including legal actions, that impact upon animals.

Centrally, this special issue further advances the growing scholarship on the links between environmental rights and animal rights to both highlight and fill some research gaps. In this regard, the issue contributes to existing scholarship that bridges the animal rights and environmental rights gap. The issue does so by critiquing the treatment of animal welfare and animal rights in existing legal frameworks and exploring how this could be rectified using existing frameworks and the development of new ones. The contributions share a pragmatism and solution-orientation in seeking to find effective, actionable routes to improved animal protection in law. Various legal and political contexts are considered, ranging from international environmental law to US wildlife law to public procurement in France. Before setting out the contributions made by the authors to this special issue, I will detail how animal rights and rights of nature have become entangled within relevant scholarship in recent years, with the question of human environmental rights emerging in the contributions.

II. The Entangling

Animal rights and rights of nature have required bridging to overcome claims regarding their normative incompatibility. One significant such claim was made in 1980 by J Baird Callicott, arguing their 'profoundly divergent cosmic visions' are incompatible with one another.⁸ Callicott pointed to how animal ethics favour the life of the individual and higher cognitive functioning, while environmental ethics favour species and positive net sum impacts on whole biotic communities. Such normative divergence is often exemplified by the case of pest management. It has been thought animal ethicists would advocate in favour of the pest at the expense of the biotic community, while environmental ethicists would advocate for destruction of the pest for the sake of the biotic community. This position has been elaborated elsewhere and accepted by many other scholars.⁹ Consequently, it became common knowledge over time that a core tension exists between environmental ethics' focus on species, particularly those that are endangered, and animal ethics' focus on individuals, particularly those where strong evidence of sentience exists.¹⁰

Gradually, investigation of the synergy between the two positions has grown, inspired in no small part by the fact that many scholars and activists who attribute ethical value to nature also attribute ethical value to animals, and vice versa. There was a growing recognition

⁷ Joe Wills, 'What Is Animal Law?' (2019) 7 Global Journal of Animal Law <<https://ojs.abo.fi/ojs/index.php/gjal/issue/view/170>> accessed 1 December 2022.

⁸ J Baird Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' (1980) 2 Environmental Ethics 311, 315.

⁹ See, for example Mark Sagoff, 'Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce' (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 297.

¹⁰ See, for example, Kristen Stilt, 'Rights of Nature, Rights of Animals' (2021) 134 Harvard Law Review Forum 276.

that progress in either field would likely be mutually beneficial¹¹ and that many important problems of a global scale such as zoonotic diseases, pandemics, and antimicrobial resistance are contributed to both by failures in animal protection and in environmental protection.¹² The conversation regarding animal and environmental *rights* has been facilitated by this growing recognition of synergy between animal and environmental ethics and law. Particularly useful is the recognition that both reject the use of property status as a legal tool to exploit animals, and both recognise the inherent value of animals.¹³ Such investigations have taken hold in *legal* scholarship in part thanks to the maturing of animal law as an academic discipline, with work by Randall Abate and others focusing upon what animal law can learn from the relatively more established environmental law.¹⁴

On these bases, it is now possible to draw from and build upon a broad range of scholarship that provides conceptual approaches that integrate both animal rights and rights of nature. Indeed, Thomas Berry's principles of Earth jurisprudence, upon which rights of nature have emerged, clearly envision space for individual animals as recipients of rights of nature.¹⁵ Other scholarship—such as Brian Favre's work on ecological understandings of legal animal rights—has also discussed how to place individuals within communities when considering animal rights and rights of nature.¹⁶ This is complimented by Macarena Montes and Kristen Stilt who argue for the effectiveness of a more synergistic strategy between animal rights and rights of nature¹⁷ and by scholarship investigating plant sentience.¹⁸ My own work on second wave animal ethics is also relevant here, advocating for more critically informed approaches to animal ethics that draw from both animal and environmental ethics.¹⁹

It is now common to see animal rights and rights of nature explored in tandem. Scholarship on rights of nature now frequently references the parallel animal rights movement,²⁰ with some mirroring Abate's work by focusing on what animal rights can learn from environmental rights.²¹ These lessons include the fact that the existence and enforcement of rights of nature makes it more feasible for other non-human (animal) rights to be recognised in law, and practice concerning rights of nature demonstrates how we may assess the interests of nonhumans such that enforcement of rights may be practicable.²² Further, scholarship on multispecies justice²³ and scholarship on posthuman and robot

¹¹ Glenn Wright, 'Animal Law and Earth Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis of the Status of Animals in Two Emerging Discourses' (2013) 9 Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 5, 18, 24.

¹² Sparks, Kurki and Stucki (n 6) 152.

¹³ *ibid* 121.

¹⁴ Randall Abate and Environmental Law Institute (eds), *What Can Animal Law Learn from Environmental Law?* (Environmental Law Institute 2015).

¹⁵ Thomas Berry and Mary Evelyn Tucker (eds), *Evening Thoughts: Reflecting on Earth as Sacred Community* (Sierra Club Books 2006) 149-150

¹⁶ Brian Favre, 'Is There a Need for a New, an Ecological, Understanding of Legal Animal Rights?' (2020) 11 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 297.

¹⁷ Macarena Montes and Kristen Stilt, 'Naturalized Rights of Animals, Animalized Rights of Nature' [2024] SSRN Electronic Journal <<https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4826699>> accessed 24 October 2024.

¹⁸ Alessandro Pelizzon and Monica Gagliano, 'The Sentience of Plants: Animal Rights and Rights of Nature Intersecting?' (2015) 11 Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 5.

¹⁹ See Iyan Ofor, *Global Animal Law from the Margins: International Trade in Animals and Their Bodies* (Routledge 2024) chs 1-2 and Iyan Ofor, 'Second Wave Animal Ethics and (Global) Animal Law: A View from the Margins' (2020) 11(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 268.

²⁰ See, for example, Daniel P Corrigan and Markku Oksanen (eds), *Rights of Nature: A Re-Examination* (Routledge 2021).

²¹ Stilt (n 10).

²² *Ibid*.

²³ See, for example, Erin Fitz-Henry, 'Multi-Species Justice: A View from the Rights of Nature Movement' (2022) 31 Environmental Politics 338.

rights²⁴ make use of insights from both animal rights and rights of nature scholarship. There is also now precedent for animal rights and rights of nature to be treated in tandem not just in scholarship but also in judicial reasoning. The Estrellita case is a landmark case heard by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court that makes it clear animal rights can fall within rights of nature frameworks.²⁵ This aligns with scholarship that has argued animals can be recipients of rights of nature.²⁶

With scholarship so frequently attending to animal rights and rights of nature in tandem, this has facilitated a blossoming of different research agendas in this regard. For example, the overlap of these rights has been explored with regard to various relevant policy issues including invasive alien species²⁷ and EU animal and nature protection law.²⁸ Also, new normative and theoretical approaches to the animal question in law draw from both animal rights and rights of nature scholarship. These include proposals for: a human right to animal protection (mapping to how the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment paved the way for less anthropocentric rights of nature);²⁹ attributing property rights to wildlife;³⁰ and a ‘one rights’ approach (reflective of the ‘one health’ and ‘one welfare’ concepts) that can accommodate both animal rights and rights of nature.³¹

Noting these developments, it is now possible to recognise thick and multiple entanglements between environmental rights and animal rights. In the same way that production of animal rights scholarship accelerated once confidence in its strong normative foundation became established, so can scholarship on environmental rights and animal rights now accelerate owing to broad recognition of the normative synergy between the two. I will now set out how this special issue contributes to this acceleration.

III. The Issue

This issue’s three articles and three opinion pieces outline deficiencies in the protection of animal interests within environmental law and animal law, building on existing scholarship to propose six unique yet normatively harmonious new approaches to resolving these deficiencies. In the first article, ‘Beyond the Green Horizon: Broadening the Right to a Healthy Environment to Include Animal Welfare Rights Amid the Climate Crisis’, Tracey Kanhanga maps the ethical and legal foundations of animal rights and environmental rights.

²⁴ For example, Joshua C Gellers, *Rights for Robots: Artificial Intelligence, Animal, and Environmental Law* (Routledge 2021) and Doris Schweitzer, “‘Rights of Things’: A Posthumanist Approach to Law?” (2021) 16 *Nature and Culture* 28.

²⁵ Corte Constitucional, Caso “Mona Estrellita”, Caso No. 253020-JH 27 (Jan 27 2022) <http://esacc.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/storage/api/v1/10_DWL_FL/e2NhcNBlDGE6J3RyYW1pdGUnLCBldWlkOi c3ZmMxMjVmMiliMzZkLTRkZDQyYTM2NC1kOGNiMWIwYWViMWMucGRmJ30> accessed 24 October 2024 (Ecuador). For discussion of this case, see: Marcia Condoy Truyenque, ‘An Analysis of the Estrellita Constitutional Case from an Animal Rights Perspective’ (2023) XIX *Animal & Natural Resource Law Review* 21; Montes and Stilt (n 17) and Anne Peters, ‘Rights of Nature Include Rights of Domesticated Animals’ in Philipp B Donath, Alexander Heger, Moritz Malkmus and Orhan Bayrak (eds), *Der Schutz des Individuums durch das Recht: Festschrift für Rainer Hofmann zum 70. Geburtstag* (Springer 2023) and Saskia Stucki, *One Rights: Human and Animal Rights in the Anthropocene* (Springer 2023).

²⁶ See, for example Stilt (n 10) and Andrea Schapper and Cebuan Bliss, ‘Transforming Our World? Strengthening Animal Rights and Animal Welfare at the United Nations’ (2023) 37 *International Relations* 514.

²⁷ Guillaume Futhazar, ‘The Conceptual Challenges of Invasive Alien Species to Non-Human Rights’ (2020) 11 *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 224.

²⁸ Yaffa Epstein and Eva Bernet Kempers, ‘Animals and Nature as Rights Holders in the European Union’ (2023) 86 *The Modern Law Review* 1336.

²⁹ Stilt (n 10).

³⁰ Karen Bradshaw, *Wildlife as Property Owners: A New Conception of Animal Rights* (The University of Chicago press 2020).

³¹ Saskia Stucki, *One Rights: Human and Animal Rights in the Anthropocene* (Springer 2023) 101.

This article argues that international environmental law could award animals a right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. In ‘Mutually-Engaged Wolf-Human Relations: Indigenous Human Rights and Wild Animal Rights in the United States’, Kimberley Graham explores Indigenous perspectives on animal relations and how these are insufficiently accounted for in animal rights discourse and wolf decision-making in North America. This article argues for full and equal participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes concerning animal relations. In ‘Zooinclusivity: A New Approach to Help the Transition towards a More-Than-Human World (and Law)’, Emilie Dardenne presents selected content of her book *Considérer les Animaux. Une Approche Zooinclusive* (Presses Universitaires de France 2023) to an English-speaking audience. This article argues that Dardenne’s concept of zooinclusivity could provide a foundation for less anthropocentric decision-making in both personal and political decision-making.

In the first opinion piece, ‘Rethinking Animal Welfare in Tunisian Animal Husbandry Law in the Context of Environmental Rights’, Rachid Bouajila critiques the Tunisian Animal Husbandry Law in the light of best practice examples from other jurisdictions and arguments in favour of animals’ intrinsic value. Bouajila opines that growing recognition of synergy between environmental rights and animal rights ought to inspire improved legal protection of animal welfare. In “‘Save yourselves’”: Self-interest as a stepping stone towards ending animal abuse industries’, Daniel Clark highlights how humans stand to benefit from recognising animal rights in law. Clark opines that a pragmatic “self-ish” approach could provide a gradual approach to enhancing legal animal welfare protections. In ‘Individuals vs. Species: A Critique of Environmental Law’s Focus on Biodiversity’, Rimona Afana critiques environmental law’s neglect of individuals in favour of species. Afana opines that her proposed framework which emphasises individual animal rights, victimhood and sentience could improve the treatment of animals within environmental law. I will now outline the key contributions of each in brief.

The first two articles provide important normative framing for the special issue, with Kanhanga focusing on the rights narratives that have dominated deep animal and environmental protection scholarship, and Graham focusing on Indigenous knowledge that provides a useful counterpoint to rights emerging from settler colonial contexts. Kanhanga explores normative and historical insights into animal rights and environmental rights within legal contexts. This entails outlining the evolution of law regarding rights of nature and animal rights and the disconnect between the two. Notable in Kanhanga’s article is engagement with Saskia Stucki’s recent work proposing that animals can be considered to have so-called ‘animal welfare rights’. That is, non-explicit rights that provide legal protection falling short of the depth and force of fundamental rights but extending beyond animal welfare protections offered to animal legal objects. This scholarship is central to Kanhanga’s argument that animals do not have explicit and legally enforceable rights in international law, but they *do* have animal welfare rights which Kanhanga considers a stepping stone toward explicit recognition of animal rights.

Kanhanga then argues for improved recognition of animal rights in international law by recognising and enforcing an *animal* right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. This approach is seen as a pragmatic inroad for animal welfare rights in international law because such a right can be interpreted into the existing law. Kanhanga conducts a systematic interpretation in line with article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of pertinent international law instruments. This systematic interpretation considers the place of animal welfare within three elements of the right to a healthy environment: healthy biodiversity, ecosystems, and a safe climate.

Graham proposes an alternative path to improved animal protection in law. Graham describes rights narratives as arising out of settler colonial world views. She problematises

the rights narrative for treating animals as an ‘aggregated abstract, neglecting species-specific considerations and relations’ and for its basis in ‘anthropocentric hierarchies and hegemonic dynamics’ relying, for example, on the So-Like-Us approach.³² To advance alternative approaches, Graham explores Indigenous knowledge, critical theory, continental philosophy and feminist legal theory. While some animal rights scholarship acknowledges such insights, they are more commonly located within a second wave of animal ethics that follows (overlappingly) with rights-based and other approaches within a first wave.³³ The notion of rights has been argued to sit at odds with Indigenous cosmovisions³⁴ and so it is important that Graham notes it remains uncommon to ground animal rights in practices of ‘deeply listening to Native American relationships with animals’.

Graham aims to fill this research gap by deeply listening to Indigenous animal relationships, considering how associated practices could form the basis for ‘conceptualizing and operationalizing wild animal rights’ in efforts to avoid ‘domination dynamics’ within institutions and decision-making processes. So, Graham takes a somewhat pragmatic stance by seeking to evolve existing rights frameworks to more deeply embed Indigenous knowledge, rather than eschewing that framework altogether. The animal relationships Graham focuses upon are Native American wolf relations, described as ‘mutually-engaging’, based on equitable partnerships, which empower wolf agency and recognise the indivisibility of cultural, environmental, and wild animal rights.

Graham discusses this approach in the context of an examination of Native American reactions to US federal and state wolf decision-making—particularly the de-listing of gray wolves from the US Endangered Species Act in late 2020—which she describes as ‘inconsistent’, ‘fluctuating’ and backed by ‘hate narratives’. A touchstone of the Native American reaction is ‘The Wolf: A treaty of Cultural and Environmental Survival’ launched by North American Tribal Nations. So, while Kanhanga focuses upon the international legal domain, Graham focuses upon Indigenous legalities as well as domestic and transboundary law. Graham concludes that consultation and participation of Native Americans is necessary in wolf decision-making processes particularly through processes that ‘center respect, and revere diversity of lively relatives in an active cultivation of reciprocal and respectful exchanges’.

Following Graham’s article, Dardenne moves the issue’s focus from the legal realm to the political and from the adaptation of existing knowledge and approaches to the generation of a new ‘zooinclusive’ approach. Dardenne elaborates on Kanhanga’s exploration of the normative underpinnings of animal law (sentientism and zoocentrism) and environmental law (biocentrism and ecocentrism) using the 1992 Rio Declaration as an example. This commentary on the invisibility of individual animals in (international) environmental law is a common refrain within scholarship on animals’ place within environmental law. Zooinclusivity would, Dardenne claims, enhance synergies between animal law and environmental law and inspire a legal and cultural shift away from anthropocentrism.

Arguments for the necessity of zooinclusivity are borne out in Dardenne’s book; this article focuses on detailing the approach itself. Zooinclusivity draws from animal studies, critical theory, and social psychology. Dardenne distinguishes it from animal welfarism, ethical veganism, antispeciesism, and critical animal studies. It does not propose a new ethics or philosophy but, instead, an approach to considering animals that would complement the

³² This approach determines that ethical subjects should be afforded ethical consideration due to their similarity to the dominant human archetype.

³³ Iyan Ofor, *Global Animal Law from the Margins: International Trade in Animals and Their Bodies* (Routledge 2024) chs 1-2.

³⁴ Mihnea Tanasescu, ‘Rights of Nature, Legal Personality, and Indigenous Philosophies’ (2020) 9(3) *Transnational Environmental Law* 429

development of more-than-human rights. Dardenne outlines the approach by applying it to a case study from her book regarding urban governance. This contribution to the political turn in animal studies aligns with the approach of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka in *Zoopolis*, a book which heavily inspired zoonclusivity. The case study considers public procurement in France and integration of animal welfare as a criterion for public tender. This demonstrates how zoonclusivity invites actors to reconsider behaviour regarding animals prioritising peaceful cohabitation.

The three opinion pieces that follow build on Dardenne's forward motion, presenting further options to different legal case studies. Bouajila's opinion piece shifts the issue's attention from the Global North to the Global South, assessing the Tunisian Animal Husbandry Law in a critical and comparative manner. Bouajila adopts environmental rights and animal rights as a conceptual framework for the opinion piece, building on the articles in this issue by considering intrinsic value of more-than-human life within both frameworks. Bouajila returns to Kanhanga's distinction between animal welfare and animal rights, and considers the distinction between anthropocentric environmental rights—like the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment—and rights for nature. Bouajila emphasises the recent trend of recognising synergy and promoting integration between environmental rights and animal rights, focusing on the livestock industry's impact upon climate change and environmental sustainability as a key instigator of this trend and motivator for improved animal welfare protection in law.

Bouajila's rights-based critique of the Tunisian Animal Husbandry Law notes that it contains very few provisions pertaining to animal health and welfare and none preventing unnecessary suffering or cruelty to animals. Bouajila argues this means the law falls behind the standards of the World Organisation for Animal Health (of which Tunisia is a member) and best practice examples from other jurisdictions (Austria, Germany, Sweden, Taiwan, and the EU). On this basis, Bouajila advocates for deeper and more humane animal welfare law in Tunisia, arguing that a rights-based approach could facilitate this. While the argument to use animal rights to deepen animal protection in law is now relatively common, this argument has rarely, if at all, been applied to Tunisian law. In this regard, Bouajila's opinion piece contributes to the extension of animal law scholarship to more jurisdictions across the globe.

The final two opinion pieces compliment Dardenne's generative approach by proposing new frameworks and concepts. Clark's new 'self-ish approach' emerges from critique that animal rights norms have failed to produce meaningful legal protection for animals, change to animal industry, and citizen action aligned with public morality and recognition of animal sentience. Clark argues that basing animal rights arguments on a self-ish approach rather than animals' interests would be more pragmatic and capable of producing results because we routinely focus upon human interests when legislating regarding animals. The crux of Clark's argument is that protecting human interests requires going beyond anthropocentric approaches to legislating, pointing to examples of environmental and health crises like antimicrobial issues and health issues related to heavy meat consumption that result when failing to do so.

Clark further supports this argument by noting that environmental law provides a model with rights for nature awarded on the basis of self-interest. Clark argues that the motivations behind shifts toward ecocentrism in environmental law scholarship and practice like avoiding ecological collapse and a sixth mass extinction satisfy human self-interest. Clark points out that animal rights protections are typically considered unnecessary to achieve these goals. He argues this is erroneous because speciesism contributes to these environmental catastrophes. To illustrate this, Clark draws on recent examples from the UK including the UK government's opposition to rights of nature. Clark also addresses the

problem of algal blooms in the River Wye caused by chicken manure running off nearby fields. This illustrates interlinkage between environmental, animal, and human rights.

Clark's pragmatic approach contrasts with Afana's proposed new framework which is more aspirational in tone. Like Kanhanga, Dardenne and Bouajila, Afana notes the tensions between animal law and environmental law, pointing to pests as a focal point of arguments highlighting normative incompatibility between the two. Afana extends Dardenne's discussion of the invisibility of individuals within species-centric environmental law by exploring how this manifests in various environmental law instruments: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, the Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement, and the US' Endangered Species Act.

In response, Afana opines that a framework centring animal rights, victimhood, individuality and suffering is a more attractive alternative. Thus, Afana proposes criteria for conferring rights on animals, asserting that sentience and the experience of pain and suffering should be central. Afana's framework closely relates to growing scholarship on compassionate conservation by arguing for more compassionate approaches to sentient wild animals in law. This argument acknowledges harms caused to animals as crimes in the way zemiology and critical criminology recognise notions of crime extending beyond those recognised in law. Afana also explores the necropolitics guiding biodiversity and conservation regimes, highlighting how those in power dictate death, dying and killing. Just as Clark notes growing recognition of animal sentience is not met with morally appropriate responses in law, so does Afana argue that sentientism and pianism ought to inspire more sustainable and ethical recognition of individuals within (international) environmental law.

In sum, this special issue builds upon the entangled scholarly landscapes of animal rights and environmental rights. It points to various avenues for the improvement of animal protection that are revealed through exploration or acceptance of conceptual synergies between the two rights. This issue adds to the growing body of approaches that already exists in the literature, with regard paid to questions of pragmatism. Indeed, with animals' legal situation being as dire as it is proven to be throughout this issue, it is not surprising that the authors write as though there is no time to waste.